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Abstract This paper assesses the achievement and the limitation of our path to the 
stabilization of anthropogenic carbon emissions with economic growth using a stochastic 
Kaya model. The elasticity of carbon dioxide emissions with respect to anthropogenic drivers 
such as population, affluence, energy efficiency, fossil-fuel dependence, and emission factor 
is estimated using panel data of 132 countries from 1960 to 2010. Then the stochastic Kaya 
model is used for index decomposition analysis. Investigating the scale and the counteracting 
effects, I find that except a few countries like Germany, most countries have not achieved the 
goal of carbon reductions with economic growth. In addition, the current path of each nation 
does not guarantee the achievement of a global long-term goal of emissions reductions, say 
50% by 2050 compared to the 1990 level. This is because the scale effect (the sum of the 
population and affluence effects) is so large that the current level of the technology effects 
can rarely offset carbon emissions. Should we achieve the global target for carbon reductions 
a significant amount of technology effects through stringent policy interventions need to be 
accompanied. 
 
1. Introduction 
Two decades have passed since the advent of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which initiated the international climate-policy regime. Are we 
approaching “the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere” in a 
manner to “enable economic development” (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 2: Objective)?1 Among 
others we here focus on the changes of anthropogenic carbon emissions.
2
 
                                           
1
 Broadly speaking, this objective can be rephrased as “sustainable development” or “ecological modernization”. 
For more discussion on the notions see Brutland (1987), Hajer (1995), Langhelle (2000), Mol and Sonnenfeld 
(2000) and Jӓnicke (2008), among others.  
2
 The reasons are that 1) anthropogenic CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas in terms of its magnitude of 
emissions (Canadell et al., 2007; Solomon et al., 2007; Le Quéré et al., 2009) and that 2) data for CO2 emissions 
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One thing to note for such an evaluation is that looking at the changes of carbon emissions 
between two periods of interest alone may mislead policy implications. The reason is that 
there are so many drivers of carbon emissions that they cannot be represented in just one 
dimension like the change of emissions.
3
 For instance, carbon reductions of the Economies 
in Transition (EIT) during the early 1990s and those of member countries of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) during the recent financial crisis are 
never the signs that show the current path is sustainable. During such economic recessions, 
carbon emissions decrease even without technological improvements (e.g., improvements in 
energy efficiency or the propagation of renewable energy) or behavioral changes (e.g., 
consuming less carbon intensive materials) because economic downturn itself reduces the 
demand for energy. Furthermore, this is not what we hope for - or UNFCCC aims for - when 
we say “the stabilization of GHG emissions” along with “economic development”.  
The IPAT identity (Commoner et al., 1971; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) and its variants 
such as the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990), the I=PBAT identity (Schulze, 2002) and the 
ImPACT identity (Waggoner and Ausubel, 2002) have been widely used for analyzing 
anthropogenic drivers of environmental impacts since the early 1970s (Chertow, 2001; Rosa 
and Dietz, 2012). Such methods assume that the relation between an environmental impact 
and its driving forces can be represented as a mathematical identity. For instance, the IPAT 
identity defines that human impacts are equivalent to the product of population, affluence and 
technology.  
Beside its simplicity, the IPAT and its variants have an advantage that the acquisition of 
data is less demanding. For instance, indicators for an IPAT analysis such as population, 
affluence (e.g., gross world output), and environmental impacts (e.g. pollutants) have been 
developed by each country or by some international organizations (e.g., United Nations, 
World Bank, International Energy Agency) and they are usually open for research purposes. 
As a result we can find a huge number of applications of the IPAT and its variants.
4
 The 
index decomposition analysis (IDA) in energy literature is one of such examples (Ang and 
Zhang, 2000; Ang and Zhou, 2010).
5
 The changes of environmental impacts such as carbon 
                                                                                                                                   
are relatively well documented compared to the other greenhouse gases such as methane, nitrous oxide and F-
gases and that 3) anthropogenic CO2 emissions are directly related to economic activities (e.g., energy use) and 
thus they are better suited for the purpose of the current paper and that 4) anthropogenic CO2 emissions are less 
uncertain than the other gases (Penman et al., 2000). 
3
 For a comprehensive review on various kinds of driving forces of carbon emissions see Rosa and Dietz (2012).  
4
 Main areas of applications are industrial ecology and energy economics. Some examples of international 
comparisons on carbon emissions are Dietz and Rosa (1997), Hoffert et al. (1998), Greening et al. (1998), Shi 
(2003), Bacon and Bhattacharya (2007), Raupach et al. (2007), Agnolucci et al. (2009), Jorgenson and Clark 
(2010) and Jotzo et al. (2012). 
5
 Ang and Zhang (2000) reported that there were over a hundred of papers applying IDA in energy literature. 
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emissions between two periods of interest can be quantitatively attributed to each driving 
force from IDA.
6
  
One of the critics on IPAT and its variants is that statistical tests are not available for them 
because they use a mathematical identity (York et al., 2003). In addition, IPAT and its variants 
assume the unit elasticity of environmental impacts with respect to each driving force, which 
is not supported by empirical data (Rosa and Dietz, 2012). Accounting for these drawbacks 
Dietz and Rosa (1994) developed a stochastic IPAT model, namely the Stochastic Impacts by 
Regression on Population, Affluence and Technology (STIRPAT). The STIRPAT model 
includes an error term and the elasticity of an environmental impact with respect to each 
driving force is estimated from empirical data. 
The current paper extends STIRPAT by constructing a stochastic Kaya model, whereas 
STIRPAT uses IPAT. In addition, I apply IDA derived from the stochastic Kaya model, 
whereas the existing literature use IDA derived from (deterministic) IPAT or its variants. For 
the calibration of the model I use panel data for all countries of the world where data are 
available. In specific, I use data including population, gross domestic output, the total 
primary energy, fossil-fuel dependence and CO2 emissions from energy use and cement 
manufacturing for 132 countries from 1960 to 2010.  
From the model and IDA, this paper investigates how each country has offset or increased 
its CO2 emissions and then projects future CO2 emissions to 2050. The main findings of the 
this paper are that 1) except a few countries like Germany, most countries have not achieved 
the goal of CO2 reductions with economic growth and that 2) the current path of each nation 
does not guarantee the achievement of a global long-term goal of carbon reductions, say 50% 
by 2050 compared to the 1990 level (van Vuuren, 2012).
7
 This is because the scale effect 
(the sum of population and affluence effects) is so large that the current level of the 
technology effects can rarely offset carbon emissions. Should we achieve the global target for 
carbon reductions, a significant amount of the technology effects through stringent policy 
interventions need to be accompanied. 
The current paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the stochastic Kaya model and 
the IDA equations. Section 3 illustrates the panel data used in this paper and the results for 
statistical tests. The results of IDA are discussed in Section 4. The scenario analysis for future 
                                           
6
 The structural decomposition analysis (SDA) is another stream of research on quantifying driving forces of 
human impacts. See Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2003) for a comparison of the two methods in detail. 
7
 The exact amount of reductions and the due time are not yet made as the global target, although the consensus 
that 50% or more reductions by 2050 are inevitable if we hope to avoid climate catastrophe is growing. A global 
goal expressed as an emissions level (e.g., Kyoto target) is subject to critics, however. Since greenhouse gas 
(GHG) has a stock effect (note that the half-life of each GHG is well beyond hundreds of years) (Solomon et al., 
2007), the goal should account for a time-path of emissions. An alternative is a goal for temperature increases. 
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emissions is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Model and Methods 
2.1. Stochastic Kaya Model 
A stochastic modification of the Kaya identity is as follows. Compared to the Kaya model, 
the carbon intensity effect is further decomposed into the effect of fossil-fuel dependence and 
the effect of emission factor, following Bacon and Bhattacharya (2007).
8
 In addition, an error 
term is added and the elasticity of each driving force needs not to be unity.  
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where 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote country and time period, P, G, T, F and C are population, per capita 
GDP, energy intensity, fossil-fuel dependence and the total emission factor,
9
 respectively, 
CO2, POP, GDP, TPE and FF are CO2 emissions, population, gross domestic product, the total 
primary energy and fossil fuel, respectively,   is a constant, 𝛽 is the elasticity of CO2 
emissions with respect to each driving force, and   is the error term. See Waggoner and 
Ausubel (2002) and Bacon and Bhattacharya (2007) for more discussions on each driving 
force and its policy implications.  
Taking natural logarithm on each side of Equation (1):  
  (     )  𝛽  𝛽   (  )  𝛽   (  )  𝛽   (  )  𝛽   (  )     (2) 
 
where 𝛽    ( ) and   is the residual. Note that we drop 𝑖 for simplicity and the term for 
emission factor is included in the residual term for statistical tests (York et al., 2003).
10
 
                                           
8
 The original Kaya model decomposes carbon emissions into population, affluence, energy intensity (the 
reciprocal of energy efficiency), and carbon intensity.  
9
 Note that the total emission factor is different from an emission factor of a certain fossil fuel. Mathematically 
it is calculated as                  ⁄  (∑       𝑗𝑗    𝑗  ) ∑       𝑗𝑗⁄ , where j is each fossil fuel (e.g., coal, oil, natural 
gas). Therefore, the effect of fuel mix is reflected in the emission-factor effect in Equation (1). 
10
 Although there are independent data for the emission factor of each fossil fuel (Eggleston et al., 2006), it is 
not easy to calculate the total emission factor (see endnote 9). This is because the disaggregated data for energy 
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Following the convention of IPAT literature, the residual term captures all remaining factors 
not included in Equation (2).  
For scenario analysis in Section 5, the residual is further decomposed into the emission-
factor effect and remaining errors using the following model.  
   𝛽    𝛽   (  )     (3) 
 
where 𝛽    is a constant and   is the remaining error. 
 
2.2. IDA Equations 
For the derivation of equations for IDA, I follow the method of logarithmic mean Divisia 
index (LMDI) decomposition. For the method in detail and comparisons with other methods, 
see Ang (2004, 2005) and Ang et al. (2009). Whereas the usual LMDI derives the IDA 
equations from a mathematical identity such as IPAT, I here derive the equations from the 
stochastic model (2).  
Since Equation (2) holds for each time period, the difference between equations for 𝑡1 and 
𝑡  reads:  
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where 𝑡1 and 𝑡  are time periods of interest, respectively, and  1   𝑡2 −  𝑡1. 
Multiplying 𝐴     ≡ (      −       )   (            ⁄ )⁄  to the both side of Equation (4), the 
change of CO2 emissions between the two periods is decomposed into each driving force as 
follows.  
      −                               (5) 
 
where      𝐴     𝛽   (      ⁄ ) ,      𝐴     𝛽   (      ⁄ ) ,      𝐴     𝛽   (      ⁄ )  and 
                                                                                                                                   
use (on each fuel basis: e.g., gasoline, diesel etc.) are not easily accessible. Thus it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to include independent data for the total emission factor. 
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     𝐴     𝛽   (      ⁄ ) refer to the effects of population, affluence, energy-efficiency and 
fossil-fuel dependence, respectively on CO2 emissions, and    𝐴      1.  
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) and following the same procedure leads to:  
                                          (6) 
 
where      𝐴     𝛽   (      ⁄ ) is the effect of emission factor on CO2 emissions and    is 
the residual.  
 
3. Calibration 
3.1. Data 
For estimating the elasticity of each driving force, the data on population, GDP (PPP, 2005 
constant US$), the total primary energy, fossil-fuel dependence (%) and CO2 emissions of 
each country are collected from the world development indicator (WDI) dataset of the World 
Bank.
11
 The dataset covers all countries of the world from 1960 to 2011. The number of 
countries that have all the above-mentioned data are 132 and the total number of observations 
for each variable (e.g., population) is 4,416, which is less than 6,732 (=132 countries×51 
years) because the data-availability is different from country to country. The WDI data for 
population and energy use are based on national statistics, the estimates of the United Nations 
Population Division, and the estimates of the international energy agency (IEA), respectively. 
Carbon dioxide data of the WDI dataset include emissions from energy consumption and 
cement manufacturing.
12
  
 
3.2. The Elasticity of CO2 Emissions 
Since this paper uses panel data, the ordinary least square (OLS) regression applied to 
Equation (2) may be subject to statistical problems such as serial correlation or multi-
collinearity (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2009). Thus I apply Equation (4) for OLS to estimate 
the elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to each driving force. Equation (4) compares the 
                                           
11
 Data can be downloaded at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (The World 
Development Indicators 2013). 
12
 Note that the dataset provides production-based CO2 emissions. For the consumption-based calculations see 
Davis and Caldeira (2010). 
7 
 
differences of the variables between two time periods of interest of the same country. 
Therefore some possible fixed effects of each country and some possible lagged effects of the 
time series are less severe for Equation (4) than for the static model of Equation (2).
13
 The 
similar method (the first-difference model) is used by Jorgenson and Clark (2010). As Table 1 
illustrates, this method performs well. Serial correlation (see Durbin-Watson statistics) and 
multi-collinearity (see VIF statistics) are not serious problems for the model and all the 
coefficients are statistically significant (see p-value).
14
  
 
Table 1 The results for model (4) 
 𝛽 Standard error VIF 
(Constant) -.00637
**
 .00186 
 
Population 1.030
***
 .017 1.372 
per capita GDP 1.049
***
 .020 2.274 
Energy intensity .670
***
 .020 1.507 
Fossil-fuel dependence .575
***
 .024 1.438 
Note: ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .001, Number of observations: 4,416, adjusted R
2
: .617, Durbin-Watson: 
2.346 
 
As Table 1 shows, a 1% increase in population, per capita GDP, energy intensity and fossil-
fuel dependence results in 1.03%, 1.05%, 0.67% and 0.58% increase in CO2 emissions, 
respectively. These results are generally consistent with the estimates of the literature (Rosa 
and Dietz, 2012).
15
  
Table 2 is the results for Equation (3). It illustrates that statistical problems do not pose a 
significant problem to the model and the coefficient is statistically significant. A 1% increase 
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 Of course the data for initial year are lost when Equation (4) is applied instead of Equation (2).  
14 From residual plots and some test statistics (Wooldridge, 2002), it is also found that heteroskedasticity is not 
a significant problem to the model (results not shown). 
15 These results are comparable to the estimates of the literature. Since the existing literature applies different 
specifications to their models, I only present the results comparable to the model of this paper below. York et al. 
(2003), with cross-sectional data for 146 countries in 1996, estimated that the elasticity of CO2 emissions with 
respect to population is 1.019. Brizga et al. (2013) performed regression for the time period of 1990-2010 for the 
15 former Soviet Union countries. Their estimates for population and affluence are 1.003 and 0.864, respectively. 
The estimates of Jorgenson and Clark (2010) for population and affluence are 1.43 and 0.65, respectively. They 
used the data for the time period of 1960-2005 for 86 countries. 
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in emission factor results in 0.875% increase in CO2 emissions.
16
 
 
Table 2 The results for model (3) 
 𝛽 Standard error VIF 
(Constant) .00296
***
 .00063 
 
Emission factor .875
***
 .005 1.000 
Note: *** p-value < .001, Number of observations: 4,416, and the adjusted R
2
: .874, Durbin-Watson: 2.114 
 
4. Driving Forces of CO2 Emissions 
4.1. CO2 Emissions 
This section focuses on the changes of emissions from 1990 since it is the basis year for the 
current international climate-policy regime. To this end the UNFCCC dataset (in specific, 
energy related CO2 emissions) is used for UNFCCC-Annex 1 countries, while the WDI 
dataset is used for non-Annex 1 countries.
17
 This is because, for the periods of interest, CO2 
emissions data of WDI are not complete for Annex 1 countries. For instance, the emissions 
data for Germany are reported from 1991 in the WDI dataset. Many EIT countries have the 
similar problem. The UNFCCC dataset, however, covers complete emissions data for Annex 
1 countries from 1990, but the data for non-Annex1 countries are rare (if any, sporadic) since 
it is based on a national inventory report (NIR) of each party.
18
 The results of this paper, 
however, do not change much even if we use the WDI dataset for Annex 1 countries (results 
not shown).  
Table 3 shows CO2 emissions of major countries and groups. Since we have data for over a 
hundred of countries I should select some of them for presentation. The selection is arbitrary 
but it includes major CO2 emitters. The Kyoto target of each country is also presented in the 
last column for comparison. Although the Kyoto target is about the aggregate greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, it can be served as a proxy for a measure on how each country approaches 
the target.  
CO2 emissions of Germany, UK, France and Italy in 2010 were less than their own levels 
                                           
16
 Note that emission factor discussed in this paper can be changed according to the fuel mix of any country. For 
instance change from coal to natural gas decreases the emission factor. 
17
 Data can be downloaded at http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do (Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data). 
18
 Note that the obligation of NIR-submission applies only to Annex 1 parties. 
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in 1990. In addition, the amount of their reductions exceeded the Kyoto target, except Italy.
19
 
As a group the European Union (EU) and the UNFCCC Annex 1 (but only Annex 1-EIT) 
emit less CO2 in 2010 than in 1990. The other countries and groups presented in Table 3 
increased their levels of CO2 emissions in 2010 compared to those in 1990. Especially CO2 
emissions of South Korea and emerging markets including China, Brazil and India doubled or 
more during the past two decades. In a global scale, annual CO2 emissions increased by 51% 
from 1990. 
 
Table 3 CO2 emissions 
Country/ 
Group 
CO2 emission  
(1990) 
CO2 emission 
(2010) 
Change of emissions 
(1990-2010) 
Kyoto target 
MtCO2 
% World 
emissions 
MtCO2 
% World 
emissions 
MtCO2 
% 1990 
emissions 
% 1990 
emissions 
France 371  1.7  370  1.1  -1  -0.4  0.0  
Germany 979  4.4  772  2.3  -207  -21.2  -21.0  
Italy 404  1.8  404  1.2  -1  -0.1  -6.5  
Spain 206  0.9  261  0.8  56  27.0  15.0  
UK 573  2.6  493  1.5  -80  -14.0  -12.5  
EU 4,109  18.5  3,655  10.9  -454  -11.1  -8.0  
Australia 260  1.2  385  1.1  125  48.3  8.0  
Canada 425  1.9  511  1.5  85  20.0  -6.0  
Japan 1,068  4.8  1,137  3.4  69  6.4  -6.0  
US 4,912  22.1  5,586  16.6  674  13.7  n.a. 
Annex1 14,054  63.2  13,440  40.0  -614  -4.4  -5.2  
Annex1-EIT 3,999  18.0  2,431  7.2  -1,567  -39.2  n.a. 
Annex1-nonEIT 10,055  45.2  11,009  32.7  953  9.5  n.a. 
Mexico 314  1.4  444  1.3  129  41.1  n.a. 
South Korea 247  1.1  568  1.7  321  129.8  n.a. 
OECD 11,282  50.8  12,592  37.5  1,309  11.6  n.a. 
Brazil 209  0.9  420  1.2  211  100.9  n.a. 
China 2,461  11.1  8,287  24.7  5,826  236.8  n.a. 
India 691  3.1  2,009  6.0  1,318  190.9  n.a. 
World 22,223  100.0  33,615  100.0  11,393  51.3  n.a. 
Note: The shaded cells highlight countries or groups where their CO2 emissions were reduced during the past 
two decades. n.a.: not applicable.  
 
4.2. Driving Forces of CO2 Emissions 
IDA gives quantitative information about the effect of each driving force on the changes of 
CO2 emissions between the time periods of interest. The driving forces of CO2 emissions 
between 1990 and 2010 are presented in Table A1 of Appendix A. The results like Table A1 
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 Strictly speaking, the Kyoto target should be met for the first commitment period (2010-2012). 
10 
 
of Appendix A for the other time periods are obtained but I here present only the results for 
2010 for the purpose of illustration. As Table A1 of Appendix A shows, the main drivers of 
CO2 emissions for almost all countries were the affluence effect and the population effect, 
whereas energy efficiency, fossil-fuel dependence and others (mainly, emission factor) played 
a role in (partially) offsetting CO2 emissions. The relative magnitude of each driving force 
was different from country to country.  
The results in Table 3 and Table A1 are sensitive to the choice of the time period. Thus the 
results themselves may mislead policy implications. For instance, from Table 3 and Table A1 
Annex1-EIT countries seem to have performed well in terms of CO2 reductions. However, is 
it consistent with the objective of UNFCCC (see Section 1)? In order to answer the question 
we need a chained decomposition analysis, a series of decomposition analyses applying time-
series data (Ang and Zhou, 2010).  
 
4.3. The Scale and Technology Effects 
Instead of investigating the results case by case in detail, I will focus on the aggregate effect - 
the scale and the counteracting (or technology) effects - for the purpose of this paper.
20
 The 
scale effect is the sum of the population and affluence effects and the technology effect is the 
sum of the energy efficiency, fossil-fuel dependence and other effects. The ratio of the 
technology effect to the scale effect is defined as the offsetting ratio, following Bacon and 
Bhattacharya (2007). Therefore the offsetting ratio above 100% means that CO2 emissions 
from the scale effect were fully offset by the technology effect. 
Figure 1 is the results for all countries where data are available.
21
 It shows how the scale 
and technology effects evolve over time for all countries where all the required data are 
available. Before going on the details, the way of interpretation for the figure is worth 
mentioning. The positive (negative, respectively) scale effect means that the economy has 
grown economically (undergone economic recession, resp.) and thus scale played a role in 
increasing (reducing, resp.) emissions. On the other hand, the positive (negative, respectively) 
technology effect implies that abatement-related technology has deteriorated (improved, resp.) 
and thus technology played a role in increasing (reducing, resp.) emissions. The point below 
(above, respectively) the diagonal implies that the economy has fully (partly, resp.) offset the 
scale effect. If a country achieved the objective of UNFCCC illustrated in Section 1, the 
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 As I noted, it is hard to enumerate all the literature investigating the driving forces of carbon emissions. 
Among the recent papers are Mahony et al. (2012), Brizga et al. (2013) and Rafaj et al. (2013). Interested 
readers are referred to references therein. 
21
 The number of countries analyzed is 111. It is less than the one in Section 3 since some countries having 
incomplete data for 1990-2010 are dropped. 
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country would be located in the 2
nd
 quadrant and below the diagonal in the figure. Finally, if 
the magnitude of the scale (or technology) effect is higher in a country than in the other, the 
point of the country with a higher effect is located far away from the origin.  
As Figure 1 shows, most countries did not achieve the goal of the stabilization of CO2 
emissions with economic development during the past two decades. Moreover many 
countries have deteriorated CO2 technology. This may include one (or some) of the 
followings: decreasing energy-efficiency, increasing dependence on fossil fuels, more use of 
CO2 intensive fuels (e.g., coal) than others (e.g., natural gas). Some countries underwent 
economic recession especially during the early 1990s. This pulled down the points of the 
countries below the diagonal but this is never what we hoped for. 
 
   
  
Figure 1 IDA Results. (Top left panel): 1990-1995. (Top right panel): 1990-2000. (Bottom left panel): 1990-2005. 
(Bottom right panel): 1990-2010.  
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In order to get more insight I present the results for some major economies and groups. 
Figure 2 shows the results. The top left panel is the results for some non-EIT European Union 
countries. Germany and the UK have followed good paths relative to the other countries in 
terms of the stabilization of CO2 emissions with economic development. Note that the farther 
the point is away from the diagonal (to the first quadrant), the more the country emitted in 
total. By the symmetry, this sentence holds if we replace the terms “first quadrant” and 
“higher” to the terms “3rd quadrant” and “less”. The recent global economic recession led the 
path of each nation in the top left panel in Figure 2 to lower-left parts of the figure, which 
means that emissions are reduced. This is one of the main reasons why Italy and France have 
reduced their emissions in 2010 below the level in 1990.  
The top right panel is the results for some non-EU OECD member states. The US, Japan, 
Australia and Canada show a similar pattern, although the magnitude is different from 
country to country. Technological improvements have partially offset the scale effect but they 
were not enough to achieve their national goals. The scale effect was great in South Korea but 
the technology effect further increased CO2 emissions during 1990s unlike the other nations.  
The bottom left panel is the results for Russia, emerging markets including China, India 
and Brazil and least developed countries (LDC) as a group following UN classification. 
Russia suffered from economic downturn in early 1990s and the emissions-reduction during 
the period constitutes almost all reductions that Russia has achieved for the past two decades. 
Since then emissions have increased steadily. Brazil and LDC deteriorated technology and 
these further increased CO2 emissions. Although there was a progress in CO2 technology in 
China and India, the technology effects were not enough for offsetting the huge scale effects. 
Even worse is the recent trend of China: decreasing rate of technological improvements since 
2000. Considering its magnitude in CO2 emissions, the Chinese path is one of the main 
contributors to the global trend in CO2 emissions.  
The bottom right panel shows the results for the world total, EU, Annex 1, EIT Annex 1, 
non-EIT Annex 1 and OECD. As a group EU has followed a path of almost offsetting the 
scale effect by technology. Annex 1 has undergone the similar path, but this is almost due to 
EIT Annex 1 during early 1990s. Non-EIT Annex 1 steadily increased CO2 emissions except 
the period of current recession. The path of OECD was similar to non-EIT Annex 1. The 
global situation became worse since 2000 as China did. The counteracting effect of 
technology has reduced since the early 2000s. 
 
13 
 
  
   
Figure 2 Chained IDA results for selected countries: 1990-2010. (Top left panel): non-EIT European countries. (Top 
right panel): non-EU OECD members. (Bottom left panel): Emerging economies, Russia and LDC (least developed 
countries: UN classification). (Bottom right panel): Group. 
 
5. Future CO2 emissions prospects 
In this section I project the future global CO2 emissions. To this end Equation (6) is applied 
with the coefficients in Section 3. For the world population prospects the no-change scenario 
of the United Nations Population Division is used.
22
 The growth rate of per capita GDP is 
assumed to be 2%/yr for a reference scenario.  
For technology prospects the trend of each indicator in Equation (6) from 1960 to 2010 is 
investigated (see Figure A1 in Appendix A). There is a tendency to decrease in energy 
                                           
22
 For the scenario the global population will be about 10,210 billion in 2050. The data can be downloaded at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/index.shtml (The World Population Prospects: 
The 2012 Revision). 
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intensity and fossil-fuel dependence over time (except China: increasing fossil-fuel 
dependence). The trend of emission factor is not as transparent as the other two indicators, 
but we can observe that emission factor has slightly increased after the early 2000s. One of 
the reasons is the transition of fuels from oil to coal on account of high prices of oil. It is also 
found that the technology indicators of the world total have not reached (although it becomes 
close to) the 1970 level of EU for the past 40 years. A simple thought says that if the world 
total indicators follow the historical EU path from now on with the same speed, the global 
indicators in 2050 (another 40 years ahead from now) would not be better than the current EU 
level (in 2010).
23
 This constitutes a reference scenario for CO2 technology prospects. Based 
on various levels of technological improvements, I formulate more scenarios. For instance, 
the ‘EU2010×0.5’ scenario refers to the case where each technology indicator in Equation (6) 
decreases to 50% of 2010 EU level by 2050. Note that decreasing indicator means 
technological improvement (see Equation (1)).  
This construction of scenarios, especially high technological improvements scenarios, may 
not be realistic because each technology indicator has an upper bound for improvements. For 
instance, there is a lower bound for emission factor because this effect refers to substitution 
between fossil fuels. Even if we substitute coal for natural gas perfectly, the total emission 
factor cannot be less than the one of natural gas (see endnote 9). The fossil-fuel dependence 
effect also has a lower bound since the propagation of renewables is constrained by natural 
environments. However I do not refine the scenarios further. This is because 1) this paper 
does not aim for robust CO2 projections, and 2) if the main points of this paper (i.e., the 
current path and its extension to the future do not guarantee the achievement of our goal) hold 
under the above scenarios, the fact that there may be a limit for technological improvements 
supports the points further.  
Figure 3 shows the global CO2 emissions trajectory according to each scenario.
24
 Since the 
reference scenarios for population and affluence are used (the rate of economic growth: 
2%/yr, population: about 10.2 billion in 2050), the differences between projected values are 
originated from technological improvements scenarios. Following the reference scenario of 
technological improvements (labelled as ‘EU2010’: approaching the current EU level by 
2050), the global CO2 emissions will increase more than 250% by 2050 relative to the 1990 
                                           
23
 Taken at face value, this observation can be rephrased as a statement that there is about 40 years of 
technology gap. 
24 According to the scenario there is a target for technology improvement in 2050 and we have the current level 
of technology indicators. For simplicity, I assume a linear trend for the future technology improvements between 
2010 and 2050. 
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level. This shows that such technological improvements are not enough for offsetting the 
scale effect. If we aim for decreasing CO2 emissions by 50% by 2050, we need to improve 
each technology indicator by more than 50% relative to the current EU level (labelled as 
‘EU2010*0.5’). Note that this number is not about the level of technological frontiers such as 
Germany or Japan but about the world-averaged level.  
 
Figure 3 Global CO2 emissions trajectory: 1990-2050. EU2010 refers to the reference scenario where the 
world average technology in 2050 reaches the level of EU in 2010. EU2010*x refer to the scenario where the 
world average technology in 2050 reaches the level of EU times x in 2010. The growth rate of per capita GDP is 
assumed to be 2%/yr.  
 
CO2 emissions trajectory is sensitive to the assumed scale effect. For instance if the growth 
rate of per capita GDP is assumed to be 1%/yr (3%/yr, respectively), with the reference 
scenarios on population and technological improvements, the global CO2 emissions will be 
less than double (almost quadruple, resp.) with respect to the 1990 level (see the top panel in 
Figure 4).  
Even if the emissions-reduction target is the same and it is achieved, the cumulative 
emissions are sensitive to the speed of technological improvements. For instance, a 10 year 
faster improvement in technology (that is, reaching the technology target by 2040 and then 
constant thereafter) decreases the cumulated emissions by 6.9% for the reference scenarios of 
population, affluence, and technology. If we assume that each technology indicator improves 
50% (‘EU2010*0.5’, resp.), with the reference scenarios on population and affluence, a 10 
year faster improvements reduce the amount of total emissions by 15.4%. See the bottom 
panel in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4 Global CO2 emissions trajectory: 1990-2050 (sensitivity analysis). (Top panel): Sensitivity to the growth 
rate of per capita GDP (3%/yr, 2%/yr, 1%/yr). (Bottom panel): Sensitivity to the rate of technological improvements. The 
growth rate of per capita GDP is assumed to be 2%/yr. The meaning of the label EU2010*x is the same as in Figure 3. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has assessed the achievements and the limitations of our path to the stabilization 
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions with economic growth using the stochastic Kaya model. To 
this end, the elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to each anthropogenic driver such as 
population, affluence, energy intensity and fossil-fuel dependence was estimated using the 
panel data of 132 countries from 1960 to 2010. From the analysis, I have found that except a 
few countries like Germany, most countries have not achieved the goal of carbon reductions 
with economic growth. In addition, the current path of each nation does not guarantee the 
achievement of a long-term goal of carbon reductions. If we try to achieve the target, a 
significant increase of the technology effect through stringent policy interventions should be 
accompanied. This is not an easy task of course because by the technology level I mean not 
the level of most advanced countries but the world-averaged level. How can we achieve the 
required technological improvements? Technology transfer from advanced countries to less 
developed countries and huge investments in research and development will be an answer. 
For the answer to be useful and practical, however, we need to enumerate all possible options 
and then identify the cost and benefit of each option. These are the future works to be done.   
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The analysis of this paper can be applied to the other measures of environmental impacts 
such as temperature increases. Of course this is much more demanding than the analysis of 
this paper because there are many things to consider for such an analysis, including other 
GHGs, carbon emissions from land-use changes, efficiency of natural sinks (Canadell et al., 
2007; Le Quéré et al., 2009), and so on. However such an analysis has value. For instance, 
once driving forces of temperature increases are enumerated and their magnitudes are 
quantified as was done in this paper, the model and its parameters can be applied into an 
integrated assessment model (IAM). This would give another perspective on the 
understanding of the relationship between climate and the economy. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary results 
Table A1 Driving forces of CO2 emissions: 1990-2010 
Country/
Group 
Driving forces of CO2 emissions (% 1990 emissions) Scale  
(% 1990 
emissions) 
Technology 
(% 1990 
emissions) 
Offsetti
ng ratio 
(%) 
Populat
ion 
GDP per 
capita 
Energy 
intensity 
Renewa
bles 
Emission 
factor 
France 11.0  20.8  -10.2  -8.8  -13.2  31.8  -32.2  101.2  
Germany 2.7  24.3  -21.0  -5.3  -21.8  26.9  -48.1  178.6  
Italy 6.6  13.8  -3.1  -4.4  -13.1  20.4  -20.5  100.6  
Spain 19.8  36.5  -9.8  -1.1  -18.4  56.3  -29.3  52.0  
UK 8.0  35.4  -29.1  -1.4  -27.0  43.4  -57.5  132.3  
EU 5.7  29.3  -19.5  -5.0  -21.6  35.0  -46.1  131.5  
Australia 32.4  47.8  -22.8  0.9  -10.1  80.3  -32.0  39.9  
Canada 23.2  30.8  -21.2  -0.2  -12.6  54.1  -34.0  62.9  
Japan 3.3  17.0  -4.2  -2.6  -7.1  20.3  -13.9  68.3  
US 23.6  30.8  -24.6  -1.6  -14.4  54.4  -40.7  74.8  
Annex1 9.2  30.4  -22.2  -2.9  -18.8  39.6  -43.9  111.0  
Annex1-
EIT -4.4  25.0  -28.4  -2.7  -28.8  20.6  -59.8  290.1  
Annex1-
nonEIT 15.2  28.0  -17.2  -2.4  -14.1  43.2  -33.7  78.1  
Mexico 38.7  25.3  -11.0  1.7  -13.6  64.0  -22.9  35.8  
S. Korea 22.8  140.0  -1.0  -1.0  -31.0  162.8  -33.0  20.3  
OECD 16.4  29.0  -16.6  -2.3  -15.0  45.5  -33.9  74.5  
Brazil 39.6  51.6  3.3  3.6  2.9  91.2  9.8  -10.7  
China 33.0  373.1  -121.1  16.5  -64.7  406.0  -169.3  41.7  
India 60.3  176.7  -53.1  27.7  -20.7  237.0  -46.1  19.5  
World 33.9  33.5  -12.1  0.1  -4.2  67.4  -16.2  24.0  
Note: The shaded cells highlight the countries or groups in which CO2 emissions are reduced compared to the 
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1990 levels. The negative offsetting ratios for some countries were originated from technological deterioration.   
 
 
 
Figure A1 Trend of technology indicators for some selected countries: 1960-2010. (Top panel): Energy intensity. 
The right axis is for China. (Middle panel): Fossil-fuel dependence. (Bottom panel): Emission factor. For data source see 
Section 2. 
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